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Abstract
This paper examines firms’ incentives to make irreversible investments un-
der an open access policy with stochastically growing demand. Using a simple
model, we derive an access-to-bypass equilibrium. Analysis of the equilibrium
confirms that the introduction of competition in network industries makes a
firm’s incentive to make investm ents greater than those of a monopolist. We
then show that a change in access charges induces a trade off in social welfare.
That is, a decrease in the access charge expands the social benefit flow in the
access duopoly, and deters not only the introduction of a new network facil-
ity, but also a positive network externality generated by the construction of
an additional bypass network. The feasibility of socially optimal investment
timing is then discussed,
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Since the early $1980\mathrm{s}$ , competition has been introduced in public utility industries
(such as telecommunications, natural gas and electricity) in OECD countries to in-
crease efficiency and innovation. An important example of competition policy is the
open access policy, which grants entrants that do not have a network facility access
to an incumbent’s network.l Nevertheless, these industries remain characterized by
large sunk costs of investment, and increasing uncertainty in business environments.
In addition, competition lowers the expected profit flow from investment, so that
it tends to delay investment. Hence, the open access policy may reduce incentives
for a facility-based entry. Given the potentially adverse effects on incentives, the
open access policy has been reconsidered in some countries. For example, in 2003,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new rules concerning the
network unbundling obligations of incumbent local phone carriers, with the aim of
providing incentives for carriers to invest in $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}^{2}$. That is, policy makers
who have recommended the introduction of competition or open access policies are
uncertain about how effective competition in public utility or network industries is
in enhancing social welfare.
Note that an access charge in an open access policy is a crucial factor that af-
fects both the profit of firms and social benefits in network industries. However, we
should not ignore its effect on the timing of investment in infrastructure in these in-
dustries, especially when demand is expanding. In telecommunications, in addition
to the traditional telephone, several kinds of communication devices, such as mobile
telephones and Internet telephony, expand demand in the industry. For example,
the annual growth rate of information services and telecommunications industries
in Japan has been around 4% since $1997^{3}$, which suggests that more broadband
networks are required. Similarly, dem and for natural gas has been increased by
environmental protection, which suggests greater demand for broader gas pipeline
networks in the future. With growing demand, infrastructure investment can be
stimulated by access charges or other policy instruments in an open access environ-
ment.
This paper analyzes the competitive environment in public utility or network
industries by focusing on the effects of access charges on firms’ incentives to invest
when there is stochastically growing demand. We employ a real options approach
to examine issues related to investment because the industries are characterized by
1 S$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}$ OECD (2001) for details.
$2\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ new rules do not require unbundling of hybrid loops and fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) loops
for both broadband and narrowband services. Michael K. Powell, the chairman of FCC, states:
“Today’s decision makes significant strides to promote investment in advanced architecture and
fiber by removing impeding unbundling obligations. ”
$3\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}$ InfoCom Research, Inc.(2003)
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large sunk costs of investment and increasing demand (or cost) uncertainty. The
real options approach features irreversibility of investment under uncertainty. It
highlights the option value of delaying an investment decision. In fact, a decision on
the timing of irreversible investment under uncertainty is crucial for firms in public
utility or network industries.
Specifically, the real options approach is useful when a player has a sequential op-
portunity of investment timing. As is well-known, public utility industries comprise
a production facility and a netw ork facility. (For exam $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ , in the electricity industry,
a plant for generating electricity is the production facility, whereas transmission and
local distribution wires are network facilities.) In the industries, then, an entrant or
follower has a sequential opportunity of investment timing; that of a construction of
a bypass or another network facility, This is because an important characteristic of
network industries is approval for a common use of network facilities. Since network
(or essential) facilities are characterized by large sunk costs, their common use is
recommended ffom a social point of view, as long as congestion problems do not
occur, An entrant’s decision to construct a bypass may be controversial with respect
to improving welfare. In that case, the real options approach is suitable for examin-
ing the properties of an entrant’s sequential investment decision (i.e., from access to
bypass) because the application of a simple net present value (NPV) approach can-
not provide adequate understanding of an entrant’s incentives to construct a bypass
when there is uncertainty and investment is irreversible. With an NPV approach,
one would characterize the entrant’s decision about whether (or when) to construct
a bypass by comparing the net present value of profit under access with that under
use of the bypass. However, such an approach would be inappropriate because it
ignores the option value of delaying additional investment in the bypass. This is the
main reason for adopting the real options approach to examine the incentives for
investment in network industries. To sum up, this approach is useful for studying
network industries and, in particular, for studying the effect of regulatory policies
on the performance of these industries.
Using a simple model of an option exercise game, we examine a following issue;
an effect of open access policy on the timing of investment or entry. To examine
that issue, we first derive an access-to-bypass equilibrium by allowing an entrant to
access an incumbent’s network facility. In particular, we characterize the entrant’s
sequential investment timing for the construction of an additional network facility,
having accessed the incumbent’s network, in terms of an access charge and the
level of network investment cost. Analysis of the equilibrium confirms that the
introduction of competition in network industries makes a firm’s incentive to invest
greater than that of a monopolist. That is, in an access-to-bypass equilibrium, an
open access policy leads a firm to enter earlier than if there were no competition.
This implies that an open access policy provides a strong pre-emptive incentive to
1 $\epsilon\epsilon$
a firm, irrespective of the level of the access charge, as long as the access-to-bypass
equilibrium holds. We then show that a change in the access charge induces a trade-
off in social welfare. That is, a decrease in the access charge expands social benefit
flow in the access duopoly, and deters not only the introduction of a new network
facility, but also a positive network externality generated by the construction of an
additional bypass network. This trade-off occurs even when there is a usage access
charge, since the trade off is due to its effect on profit flows in the access duopoly.
While many studies have addressed the access pricing problem in public utility
industries in static economic $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s},4$ some papers have examined the effect
of access pricing on the incentive to invest in network facilities. Examples are Sidak
and Spulber (1997), Gans and Williams (1999) and Gans (2001), who considered
incentives to invest in infrastructure when there is no $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}^{5}$. The effect of
uncertainty on irreversible investment has been formally examined by Biglaiser and
Riordan (2000). However, they neither analyzed a game between an incumbent and
an entrant nor allowed an entrant to construct a bypass, A book edited by Alleman
and Noam (1999) contains some existing debate on real options approach applied
to access pricing. We formally analyze the option exercise game in public utility
or network industries by focusing on an entrant’s decision to make an additional
investment in bypass construction when there is stochastically growing demand.
In the next section, we describe the framework of a real options model for an im-
perfectly competitive network industry. In section 3, we derive the access-to-bypass
equilibrium in which the entrant first adopts an access strategy and then converts
to a bypass strategy. In section 4, we examine the properties of the equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral firms, $\mathrm{i}=1,2$ , which plan to enter a network industry,
such as electricity, telecommunications or natural gas. The network industry needs
two types of facility to serve their customers: a production facility and a network
facility. Each firm has the opportunity to invest in both types of facility, and the
investment decisions in each type are assumed to be irreversible. The investment
cost for the production facility is $I^{\mathrm{e}}>0$ , and that for the network facility is $I^{m}>0$ .
Both $I^{e}$ and $I^{m}$ are sunk costs.
Investments in the two types of facility may be undertaken simultaneously or
$4\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}$ Armstrong (2002) for an elegant survey for the access pricing problems,
$5\mathrm{A}$ special issue of Telecommunications Policy is also devoted to “Access pricing investment
and entry in telecommunications”. See especially Valletti (2003) in that issue for a discussion of
the relationship between access pricing and investment incentives
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sequentially. A firm constructs the production facility at cost $I^{e_{\dagger}}$ and at the same
time or in the next stage, the network facility is built at an additional cost of $I^{m}$ .
However, not all firms need to invest in the network facility, provided that at least
one firm maintains the facility. That is, the firm without a network facility may
utilize the existing network facility to distribute products. The firm that initially
enters the market with both production and network facilities is a leader, whereas
the other firm, which may or may not have a network facility, is a follower. We
assume that the follower can access the existing network facility through a usage
access charge, $v>0$ , which is given for each firm and determined by a policy maker.6
When the follower uses the leader’s existing network facility, the leader incurs an
access (or usage) cost for the network facility, $\mathrm{c}$ , which is the same as the cost of
its own production. Moreover, the follower, having access to the leader’s network
facility, may invest in the construction of its own network facility in the future. For
simplicity, production costs other than access costs are assumed to be zero.
We assume that the two firms compete in a market for a homogeneous good
produced in the network industry. The profit flows of the firms are uncertain because
the firms face an aggregate exogenous industry shock. The profit flow of a firm is
represented by $\pi=Y\Gamma \mathrm{I}$ $(N)$ , where $Y$ is the aggregate exogenous shock, $N=0,1,2$
is the number of active firms and $\Pi$ $(N)$ is interpreted as the non-stochastic part of
the firm’s profit flow at the industry equilibrium.
$Y$ evolves exogenously and stochastically according to a geometric Brownian
motion, with drift given by the following expression:
$dY_{t}=aYtdt+aYtdW$,
where a $\in(\mathrm{O}, r)$ is the drift parameter measuring the expected growth rate of $\mathrm{Y}$ } $r$
is the risk-free interest rate, $\sigma>0$ is a volatility parameter and $dW$ is the increment
of a standard Wiener process, where $dW\sim N(0, dt)$ . Note that $\alpha$ $>0$ implies that
the firm’s profit flow $\pi=Y\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{I}$ $(N)$ is enhanced stochastically.
A firm’s profit flow in the monopolistic equilibrium is represented by $Y\Pi$ (1).
When the two firms are active in the market, we must distinguish between two
duopolistic market structures; access duopoly’, in which the follower has access to
the leader’s network facility; and ‘bypass duopoly’, in which the follower maintains
its own network facility Let $Y\Pi^{L}(2;v)$ represent the profit flow of the leader in
the access duopoly equilibrium, and let $Y\Pi^{F}(2;v)$ represent the profit flow of the
follower. Similarly, $Y\Pi$ (2), which is the same for the leader and follower, represents
the profit flow in the bypass duopoly equilibrium.
$6\mathrm{E}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ access pricing in some public utility industries is based on a two part pricing formula
(i.e., a usage charge and a fixed charge). For analytical simplicity, we analyze only a usage charge
in this paper. See Hori and Mizuno (2003) for an analysis of a lump sum or fixed access charge
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The following relationship is assumed to hold.
Assumption 1 (i) $\Pi(1)>\Pi(2)$ and $\Pi$ (1) $>\Pi^{i}(2;v)(\mathrm{i}=L, F)$ , (ii) $\Pi(2)\geq$
$\Pi^{F}(2;v)$ , (ii) $\Pi^{L}(2;v)\geq\Pi^{F}(2;v)(<)$ if $v\geq c(<)$ ’ $( \mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i})\frac{\partial\Pi^{L}(2_{j}v)}{\partial v}>0$ , $( \mathrm{i}\mathrm{v})\frac{\partial\Pi^{F}(2_{\mathrm{i}}\cdot\iota\}}{\partial v},<0$ .
In (i), it is reasonable to assume that the equilibrium profit rt (N) is a decreasing
function of $N$ . The assumption of (ii) is based on the notion that additional supply
of the network facility improves the quality of goods or generates a positive network
externality. For example, a decrease in the probability of blackout may be generated
by the construction of another transmission wire in a local electricity market, or the
capability to provide high calorie gas may be due to the construction of additional
gas pipelines in a gas market. In telecommunications, the construction of another
broadband cable can benefit the population of Internet users, which in turn increases
the firms’ profits. It is easy to imagine that this assum ption guarantees the follower’s
incentive to construct a bypass facility. Note that we do not exclude the case in
which $\Pi^{L}(2;v)$ is greater than $\Pi$ (2). This occurs when the access charge $v$ is so high
that it generates more profit for a leader than is generated by a positive network
externality. As shown below, there exists a unique equilibrium (on which we focus)
not only in that case, but also when the leader’s profit in the access duopoly is less
than that in the bypass duopoly.
We restrict our attention to Markov strategies for a firm’s decision about when
to enter (or when to invest) : each firm’s decision depends only on the state variable
$Y$ . As an equilibrium concept fro the game, we use a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The follower has three possible strategies. First, the follower may want access to
the network facility constructed by the leader forever to save on investment costs,
$I^{m}$ . Second, the follower may want to construct its own network facility to save on
an access payment. Another possibility is that the follower initially has access to
the leader’s network facility, but then decides to construct its own network $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}^{7}$.
We refer to these three alternatives as the ‘access strategy’, the ‘bypass strategy’
and the ‘ access-to-bypass strategy’, respectively. The preference of the follower may
depend on the conditions relating to the level of investment costs, the equilibrium
profit under product market competition, the level of the access charge, and so on.
In the next section, we examine the follower’s choice of strategy before deriving the
equilibrium of the $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}$ .
$7\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ another possibility is that the follower first constructs its own network plant and then
uses the leader’s plant by paying an access charge. However, we can ignore this possibility because
network investment and the access payment are irreversible
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3 The $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}rightarrow \mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$-Bypass Equilibrium
We derive the equilibria of the game described in section 2.
3.1 The follower’s choice of strategy
First, we must consider the follower’s strategy choice when the follower is allowed
to not only have access to the leader’s network facility, but also to construct its
own network facility. As mentioned in the previous section, in this environment, the
follower has three alternative strategies: the access strategy, the bypass strategy and
the access-to-bypass strategy. We ask the question, under what conditions does the
follower choose one strategy over the others? We note that the follower’s choice can
only be appropriately determined by the real options approach under irreversible
investment and uncertainty. The standard net present value approach ignores the
option value of waiting generated by the irreversibility of the two types of investment
that the follower can make.
To answer the question, we first derive the value of each project before obtaining
the values of the three strategies.
When the access project is undertaken, its value is:
$V^{A}(Y)= \frac{Y\Pi^{F}(2\cdot v)}{r-\alpha},$ . (1)
When the bypass project is undertaken, the value of the project is:
$V^{B}(Y)= \frac{Y\Pi(2)}{r-\alpha}$ . (2)
Using (1) and (2), we can define the value of the transition project, $\Delta V(Y)$ , which
is the difference between the values of the bypass project and the access project:
$\Delta V(Y)\equiv V^{B}(Y)-V^{A}(Y)=\frac{Y\Delta\Pi(2,v)}{r-\alpha}.$ , (3)
where AII $($ 2; $v)\equiv$ II (2) $-\Pi^{F}(2\mathrm{i}v)$ is referred to as the incremental profit flow from
access to bypass.
Suppose that the bypass project is undertaken, Then, there must be a trigger
point $Y^{B*}$ , at which the bypass project begins. Defining the option value of the
transition project and using the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we
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derive the trigger point $Y^{B*}$ :
$Y^{B*}= \frac{\beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{r-\alpha}{\Delta\Pi(2,v)}.I^{m}$. (4)
Next, we derive the trigger point $Y^{A*}$ at which the access project begins. Note
that, when the bypass project is allowed, the effective value of the access project
includes not only its own project value, but also the option value of the transition
project. Hence, defining the option value of the access project and using the ffiue-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we determine the trigger point $Y^{A*.9}$
$Y^{A*}= \frac{\beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{r-\alpha}{\Pi^{F}(2,v)}.I^{e}$ . (5)
Prom (4) and (5), an increase in uncertainty deters not only the follower’s entry
by access, but also its construction of a bypass facility. That is, $\partial Y^{A*}/\partial\sigma>0$ and
$\partial Y^{B*}/\partial\sigma>0$ , since $\beta_{1}$ is a decreasing function of the volatility parameter $\sigma.10$
The derivation clarifies which strategy is adopted by the follower. When $Y^{B*}<$
$+\infty$ and $(0<)Y^{A*}\leq Y^{B*}$ , the follower adopts the access-to-bypass strategy. When
$Y^{B*}=+\infty$ and $Y^{A*}(>0)$ , the follower adopts the access strategy. When $Y^{B*}<$
$Y^{A*}$ , the follower adopts the bypass strategy. The following lemma states the con-
ditions under which each strategy is adopted by the follower,
Lemma 1 Under $\Delta\Pi$ (2; $v)>0$ of Assumption 1 (i), the follower adopts the access-
to-bypass strategy (the bypass strategy) if and only if:
$\Pi(2)\leq(>)(1+\frac{I^{m}}{I^{e}})\Pi^{F}(2;v)$ . (6)
Proof. Abbreviated. $\blacksquare$
When an incremental profit flow from access to bypass is positive, i.e., when
$\Delta\Pi(2;v)>0$ , the access strategy is not adopted by the follower. This is because
$8\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ derivation follows a standard technique in the real options literature. See Dixit and
$\mathrm{P}$ indyck (1994).
$9\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ can ensure that the trigger point $Y^{A*}$ is the same when the bypass construction is not
allowed, which means that the option value of the transition project does not affect the trigger
point for the access project $Y^{A*}$ . This is because the option to enter the market by access includes
the option value of the transition project. In fact, the option value of the transition project is
canceled out in the process of deriving $Y^{A*}:$
$10\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}$ pp.143-144 of Dixit artd Pindyck (1994) for the effect of 4 on $\beta_{1}$ .
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the aggregate shock $Y$ evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion such that
it has the expected growth rate $\alpha$ .
3,2 The equilibrium
In this subsection, we focus on the case in which the follower adopts the access-tt$>$
bypass strategy. We do so because this is a general case in the sense that it includes
two actions of the follower and shows some peculiar characteristics of network in-
dustries.










The trigger points $Y^{A*}>0$ and $Y^{B*}>0$ are (5) and (4), respectively.
Next, we consider the leader’s value function when the follow er adopts the access-
to-bypass strategy. In that case, the value function of the leader is derived as follows.
$V_{L}^{AB}(Y)=\{$
$\frac{Y\Pi(1\}}{r-\alpha}[1-(\frac{Y}{Y^{A*}})^{\beta_{1}-1}]+(\frac{Y}{Y^{A*}})^{\beta_{1}}\{\frac{Y^{A*}\Pi^{L}(2_{j}v)}{r-\alpha}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}^{1-}(_{\overline{Y}^{B}}^{Y^{A*}}.)^{\beta_{1}-1}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
$+( \frac{Y}{Y}\mathrm{E}*-)^{\beta_{1}}A*\frac{Y^{B*}\Pi[2]}{r-\alpha}\}-(I^{e}+I^{m})$ if $Y<Y^{A*}$
$\frac{Y\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}^{L}\{2_{1}\cdot \mathit{1}\prime]}{r-\alpha}.[1-(_{\overline{Y}^{7*}}^{Y_{-}})^{\beta_{1}-1}]+(_{Y}^{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{R}*)^{\beta_{1}}\frac{Y^{B}\Pi(2)}{r-\alpha}.-(I^{6}+I^{m})$
$ifY^{A*}\leq Y<Y^{B*}$
$\frac{Y\Pi(2]}{r-\alpha}-(f^{e}+I^{m})$ $if$ $Y^{B*}\leq Y$
(8)
Let us focus on the asymmetric leader-follower equilibrium, which we refer to
as the ‘access-to-bypass equilibrium’. To guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium, it is sufficient to ensure that $V_{L}^{AB}(Y^{A*})>V_{F}^{AB}(Y^{A*})$ and
that the difference between the leader’s value and the follower’s value decreases
monotonically. When the investment cost for the network facility is small relative
to the cost for the production facility and when the access charge is $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}$ fBciently high
that it offsets the benefit generated by a positive network externality for the leader,
there exists a unique equilibrium in which the follower enters the market by access
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and then builds its own bypass facility in the future. We summarize this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique access-to- bypass equilibrium in which the leader ’s
trigger point $Y_{L}^{AB}$ is characterized by
$V_{L}^{AB}(Y)<V_{F}^{AB}(Y)$ if $Y<Y_{L}^{*}$
$V_{L}^{AB}(Y)=V_{F}^{AB}(Y)$ if $Y=Y_{L}^{*}$
$V_{L}^{AB}(Y)>V_{F}^{AB}(Y)$ $\mathrm{i}f$ $Y\in(Y_{L}^{*}, Y^{B*})$
$V_{L}^{AB}(Y)=V_{F}^{AB}(Y)$ if $Y\geq Y^{B*}$ ,
under the condition that






Figure 1 shows the access-to bypass equilibrium. For $Y\in[0Y_{L}^{*}$) where $Y_{L}^{*}$ is the
trigger point at which the leader enters the market, the two firms do not enter the
market. For $Y\in[Y_{L}^{*},Y^{A*})$ , the leader earns monopoly profits. For $Y\in[Y^{A*}, Y^{B*})$ ,
the follower has access to the leader’s network facility. For $Y\in[Y^{B*}, +\infty)$ , the
follower constructs its own network facility.
4 Properties of the Equilibrium
4.1 The effect of competition
Using a real options approach, and comparing the optimal strategy of a monopolist
with the optimal strategy of a leader in duopoly, Nielsen (2002) showed that, even
with irreversible investment and uncertainty, competition induces firms to invest
earlier. We can extend this result to the access-to-bypass equilibrium derived in the
previous section
I 9B
As a benchmark, we present the investment trigger point of a monopolist, which
is given by
$Y^{*}= \frac{\beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{r-a}{\Pi(1)}(I^{e}+I^{m})$ . (10)
We then derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The leader in an access-to-bypass equilibrium enters the market ear-
lier than a monopolist.
Proof. Abbreviated, si
To prove Proposition 2, we show in the Appendix that $V_{L}^{AB}(Y^{*})>V_{F}^{AB}(Y^{*})$ for
$Y\in(0, Y^{A*})$ . The condition that $V_{L}^{AB}(Y^{A*})>V_{F}^{AB}(Y^{A*})$ , which guarantees the
existence and uniqueness of the access-to-bypass equilibrium, plays a crucial role
in the proof of the proposition. For the condition to be satisfied, as we explained
before stating Proposition 1, the access charge $v$ must exceed the access cost $c$ , or
the investment cost for the network facility $I^{m}$ must be small. Then, the leader’s
value is higher than that of the follower at $Y\in(Y_{L}^{*}, Y^{B*})$ , which means that both
firms have strong pre-emptive incentives under competition.
The meaning of this result warrants a detailed explanation. Note that the in-
troduction of competition reduces a firm’s profit flow, i.e., from II (1) to $\Pi^{i}(2;v)$
$(i=L, F)$ , which lowers a firm’s incentive to enter. In a real options approach, the
effect of the decrease in profit flow on the timing of entry is more severe than in an
NPV approach. This is because the option value of waiting is due to irreversible in-
vestment and uncertainty, which should be added to the net present value of profit.11
However, each firm has a strategic motive to extract a monopoly rent, i.e., it has
a pre-emptive incentive. Hence, the result implies that the pre-emptive incentive
for being a leader dominates the effect of a decrease in the profit flow, even if the
option value of waiting is realized. This pre-emptive-incentive-domination $effect$ was
also found by Nielsen (2002). We extend his result to an open access competitive
environment .12
Furthermore, the follower in the access-to-bypass equilibrium might also enter
the market earlier than a monopolist.
Corollary 1 When II (1) $<(1+ \frac{I^{m}}{I^{e}})\Pi^{F}(2;v)$ , the follower in the access-to-bypass
equilibrnum enters the market earlier than a monopolist.
Proof. Comparing $Y^{A*}$ with $Y^{*}$ proves this point, $\bullet$
This point is made by the formula for the trigger point (e.g., $Y^{*}$ ) by the multiplication of
$\frac{\beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}-1}(>1)$ .
12 Grenadier (2002) also emphasized the impact of competition on an exercise strategy of invest-
ment in an $\mathrm{N}$-player Cournot-Nash competition.
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Note that, even when the follower’s profit flow under access duopoly is less than
that of a monopolist (i.e., $\Pi^{F}(2;v)<\Pi(1)$ ) as stated in Assumption $1(\mathrm{i})$ , the fol-
lower may enter the market earlier than a monopolist. This is because the follower is
allowed to access the leader’s network facility by paying an access charge $v$ . In fact,
this can be the case when the investment cost for a network facility is small relative
to the cost of a production facility, and when the follower’s profit is not too small For
example, for $\beta_{1}=2$ , under aset of { $I^{m}=0.5I^{e}$ , $\Pi^{F}(2;v)=0.7\Pi$ (1), II (2) $= \frac{2.8}{3}\Pi(1)$ },
which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the follower enters
the market earlier than a monopolist.
4.2 The effect of the access charge
In the previous subsection, we showed that the introduction of competition makes
the leader enter earlier than a monopolist even when there is irreversible investment
under uncertainty. However, the access charge also affects the firm’s incentive to
enter an open-access competitive environment. We examine the effect of the access
charge on the trigger points in the access-to-bypass equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (%) $\partial Y_{L}^{*}/\partial v<0$ , (ii) $\partial Y^{A*}/\partial v>0$ , (iii) $\partial Y^{B*}/\partial v<0$ ,
Proof. Abbreviated. $\bullet$
From Proposition 3, a unit access charge can affect the investment timing of
firms. In particular, a decrease in the unit access charge can induce the follower to
enter the market early through access and construct its bypass facility late, and in-
duces the leader to enter late. That is, in the access-toebypass equilibrium, a change
in the access charge has a positive effect on the follower’s entry with access, but has
a negative effect on the leader’s entry and the introduction of bypass construction.
The result and its welfare implications are intuitive. When the access charge
decreases, consumers cannot be served early through the construction of a new
network facility by a leader (such as a new broadband cable in a rural area) and
neither can they enjoy positive network externalities early. However, they can enjoy
a longer access duopoly equilibrium in which a social benefit flow is higher than in
a monopoly $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}^{13}$. In addition, a decrease in the unit access charge usually
increases the social benefit flow itself in the access duopoly equilibrium, through an
increase in the equilibrium quantity. Therefore, there is a trade-off in the policy of
changing the access charge, which gives rise to a dilemma for a policy maker.
$13\mathrm{A}$ social benefit flow is formally defined in the next subsection
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the effects of access charges on firms’ incentives
to invest in network public-utility industries when investment is irreversible and
there is uncertainty. Since the industries are characterized by large sunk costs
for investment with stochastically growing demand, we employed a real options
approach to examine some policy issues in an open-access competitive environment.
Using a simple model, we derived an access-to-bypass equilibrium by allowing an
entrant the opportunity to access an incumbent’s network facility. In particular, we
characterized an entrant’s sequential investment timing for the construction of an
additional network facility, having accessed the incumbent’s network, in terms of an
access charge and the level of network investment costs. Analysis of the equilibrium
confirmed that the introduction of competition in network industries makes a firm’s
incentive to invest greater than that of a monopolist. That is, in an access-to-bypass
equilibrium, a firm enters earlier in an open access policy if there is competition.
We then showed that a change in the access charge induces a trade-off in social
welfare. That is, a decrease in the access charge expands social benefit flow in the
access duopoly equilibrium, and deters the introduction of a new network facility
and a positive network externality generated by the construction of an additional
bypass network. This trade off occurs even when there is only a usage access charge
through its effect on profit flows in the access duopoly equilibrium.
In our model, the firms’ investment was only a $\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}$ decision. If we allow
them to choose the size of investment, then access may clearly affect their decision in
a strong way. For example, the leader may choose a small network capacity so that
the follower cannot access it when entering the market. In addition, if the leader can
choose the quality level of a network capacity, he may try to degrade the entrant’s
ability to use the network. These are the issues of strategic entry deterrence that
has received a great deal of play in the policy arena and would be an interesting
avenue for future research.
One may think that regulatory policy tools other than lump sum subsidies or
taxes could be used to achieve the optimal investment timing. For example, if the
access charge depends on the state, such as $v(Y)$ , it may be possible to achieve the
optimum. However, in that case, firms’ profits would be non-linear functions of $Y$ ,
which would complicate the analysis. In addition, voluntary agreements on access
charges between network providers and access seekers may induce an approximate
social optim um. The search for policy tools that will achieve the social optimum is
also an important issue for future research.
I $9\theta$
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